Abstract Managers attempting to reduce crop damage used to reduce crop damage, and suggest that an integrated, community-based, low-tech approach will be by elephants encounter a range of complex technical and social issues. Subsistence farmers bear the costs associated the most sustainable solution to this conflict. with maintaining wild elephant populations and this can confound interventions designed to improve the Keywords Africa, crop raiding, elephants, farmers, human-animal conflict. livelihood security of farmers. We present a review of the issues that influence the success and failure of methods are generally impeded by a lack of funds, trained
Introduction
personnel and equipment. Farmers often feel powerless to combat the problem, and hold wildlife managers Conflict between elephants and local peoples is a major concern for wildlife management and rural development responsible for crop losses and expect some form of compensation (AfESG, 2000) . Years of piecemeal 'problem initiatives across Africa (Taylor, 1999; O'ConnellRodwell et al., 2000) . This conflict typically involves animal control' (PAC) activities have made little progress towards long-term solutions to these issues. crop damage by elephants, and solutions are generally set within a policy and legislative framework that Most of the methods currently in use fail to resolve this conflict for logistical and management reasons that attempts to address both wildlife management issues and rural development objectives. Many initiatives have compound the diBculties of implementing PAC programmes in remote areas. In this paper we suggest a new been designed to address crop loss because this can undermine the success of other programmes related to approach to PAC that is focused on what communities are able and willing to do for themselves. Shifting the agriculture or wild land conservation (Hoare, 1995) . This issue can also threaten the viability of wild animal responsibility for crop protection to farmers and providing the tools they need to repel animals is, at least populations by creating a confrontational atmosphere between farmers and wildlife managers (Taylor, 1999) .
theoretically, an approach that is more sound than any single technical solution. In some areas the problem is chronic, predictable and threatens the livelihood security of farmers living near wildlife (Hill, 1998) . Rural communities can have an influential political voice, and crop raiding often becomes Current methods to mitigate conflict a flash point for a range of local issues such as settlement and access to resources (Barnes et al., 1995) .
The options for reducing conflict between elephants and people have been documented in numerous studies Crop damage aCects subsistence farmers directly through loss of their primary food and cash resources, across Africa (Barnes, et al., 1995; Hoare, 1995; Wunder, 1996; Osborn, 1998) and fall into two general categories: and indirectly though a variety of social costs. Rural people can express their frustration with unchecked passive and active. Passive systems attempt to limit the movement of 'target species' into areas of agriculture. crop loss through passive resistance to, or even sabotage of, development projects (Hill et al., 2000) . are fired into the air to scare animals. The most common eventual solution is to kill one or more pest in order to farmers with meat. This strategy has been shown to killing of one of the group (Osborn, 1998) . The elephant responsible for the damage in the majority of cases have no deterrent eCect on the behaviour of elephants associated with the animal killed (Osborn, 1998 One of the main problems with all of these methods is that farmers do not regularly defend many of their are removed others will replace them.
Conflict between elephants and people persists even fields during the night, when most raiding occurs.
Farmers who sleep at their fields lose fewer crops where considerable resources have been devoted to solving the problem. This can be attributed to a range because they can react when an animal approaches. For example, Lahm (1996) found that 36% of farmers in of factors, including technical faults, lack of commitment of the farmers and limited resources. One of the main Gabon whose crops were destroyed by elephants did nothing to deter them. Osborn (1998) found that 85% causes of failure may be due to the centralized nature of 'reaction teams' and the logistics of patrolling lengthy of damage incidents occurred in undefended fields. Cooperation can be poor between farmers, and individboundaries between agriculture and elephant habitat. The ability to reduce crop-loss may also be due to the uals are often left to defend their own fields. Developing a commitment on the part of farmers to patrol and local conditions and the level of pressure from problem animals. Detailed analysis of each situation is needed to defend their fields is diBcult when they perceive this activity to be the responsibility of wildlife managers address specific causes of conflict, and this issue is being addressed by the Elephant Human Conflict Working (MZEP, 2001 ).
Most interventions aimed at reducing crop-loss come Group (Hoare, 2000) . There are, however, some commonalities between the successes and failures of diCerent from organizations outside of the aCected community, which include government wildlife departments and options that can be identified.
The success of passive systems depends on the material external development organizations. Farmers expect the conflict to be resolved, and when it is not, often turn and design of a fence and the behaviour of the target species. Elephants, for example, eventually find a way against the responsible agencies. Donor-funded technical solutions are often unsustainable because external to break through most fences, given enough time (Thouless, 1994) . Barriers of stones or branches built by agencies are reluctant to provide the high maintenance costs. farmers are usually ineCective against elephants. Strong non-electrified fences have worked around Kruger For example, fencing projects are usually implemented by international aid organizations. In many cases the National Park (I. Whyte, pers. comm.) but require regular maintenance. Electric fences have proven to be ownership and responsibilities for the fence were not clarified by the organization to the farmers. These donor technically eCective at limiting the movement of large mammals (Taylor, 1999) but the materials, installation projects often fail over time because of deterioration of the fence and theft of valuable fence components. In and maintenance costs make this method impractical for large-scale applications in poorer developing counmany cases the erection of a fence cannot be justified economically because of the low return from the crops tries. In addition, Thouless & Sakwa (1995) concluded that elephants can overcome modifications to fences, protected and the reoccurring investment needed from a donor. Rarely is a cost-benefit analysis undertaken, implying that design, construction and voltage do not determine a fence's eCectiveness. An expensive 'arms and if it is, the value of the lost crops is not found to justify the cost of the fence. Farmers see it as an outside race' can develop between managers and elephants that are able to adapt quickly to new fence features designed intervention that they have no responsibility for, even if financed by money generated from wildlife in their to electrify the parts of the fence that elephants destroy.
It is unclear how eCective many of the 'drive them area (Van der Wittenboren, 1999). Every field site has specific characteristics and it is away' defences are because little published information is available. References are occasionally made in unlikely that any single method will work in all situations. The factors that aCect this conflict can be unpublished management reports but, on the whole, the eCectiveness of these methods has not been properly influenced by geographical, social, cultural, historical, political and economic factors. In addition, the crucial quantified, in part because of the diBculty of experimentation in a field situation. As elephant behaviour is issue of tangible benefits to farmers from living with wildlife are often ignored, or farmers are told that some relatively adaptable, animals may habituate over time to loud noises, fires, throwing of objects and shining of abstract benefit will be forthcoming. We suggest that conflict persists in many wildlife rich areas because of torches. Most active PAC methods tend to diminish in eCectiveness after repeated use (Taylor, 1999) . In some a combination of four factors: namely, deficiencies in one-oC technical solutions, lack of farmer vigilance and cases persistent bulls are not deterred by gunfire or the cooperation, habituation of animals to any one method,
The modification of PAC methods already in use by farmers may yield successful results. For example, and the high human and social costs of living with wildlife.
improved access to materials for constructing PAC tools (e.g. string fences, sling shots, and bangers) coupled with addressing financial benefits that communities
New approaches towards mitigation
receive from wildlife. If the 'drive them away' defence does appear to meet with success in some situations, it The resolution of this conflict will involve a range of modifications to the crops farmers select, the way they is reasonable to assume that increased vigilance and cooperation combined with a wide array of diCerent lay out their fields and their location in relation to movement patterns of crop raiding animals. The geography methods of deterrence would address the dual problems of lack of farmer participation and habituation by of each conflict situation must be examined to understand how pressure between farmers and elephants can elephants.
Refining traditional methods of alarm (metal tins on be reduced. The 'hard edges' or boundaries of dense human settlement abutting a protected area tend to be strings) and scaring (drums and gunfire) may also work to reduce crop loss to elephants. For example, passive areas of high conflict between wild animals and people. Numerous park planners have suggested the creation methods such as an alarm system using cow bells mounted on a string fence may be utilized that reduces of buCer zones around protected areas, where human influence is graduated, thus relieving the pressure on the time a farmer must spend awake at night. To reduce time waiting for elephants, farmers can cooperate in a both the protected area and the surrounding human population (Taylor, 1982) . To create an eCective buCer system of rotating 'guard duty' whereby only a few farmers patrol during the night, and when an elephant zone for elephants, a zone of 'reduced attractiveness' between the protected area and the surrounding crops is sighted other farmers are woken to chase crop raiding elephants away (Osborn & Parker, 2002) . Active systems must be created (Seidensticker, 1984; Thouless, 1994) . This involves clearing secondary forest on the boundary in which farmers are armed with whips and long poles on to which large bundles of dried grass are tied have and creating some distance between the boundary and cultivation. An optimal buCer zone should contain also shown potential. The whips are cracked and the grass is set alight and a combination of the light and unpalatable crops grown adjacent to sub-optimal elephant habitat. Tests with buCer zones are being sound deter elephants from entering fields (C. Santipilli, pers. comm.). In Zambia, farmers report that whips are conducted in Zimbabwe, in which an area 5 m wide is cleared by farmers between the forest and fields (Osborn used to make a sound similar to a gunshot, and several individuals snapping these whips have kept elephants & Parker, 2002) . This has been found to increase the 'wariness' of elephants intent on raiding, and enabled at bay for some time (Osborn & Welford, 1997) . Some of the experimental work that has addressed farmers to see the elephants before they enter a field. String fences of two or three lines were added to the the development of methods to keep elephants away from areas that humans occupy has included research on buCer zone if elephants crossed during previous nights and this increased the psychological barrier for crop acoustic deterrents. Kangwana (1993) played recordings of Maasi cattle noise to elephants in Amboseli National raiding elephants.
The active management of a buCer zone with low-cost Park, Kenya. These elephants are periodically hunted or injured by Maasi, and she concluded that elephants string fences, coupled with a vigorous deterrence regime, may instil recognition in elephants attempting to raid that retreated from the recordings because of an association made between the danger posed by the Maasi, and the the fence demarcates a 'no-go' area. Some success at limiting elephant movements with simple wire or string sounds of their cattle. A number of studies of elephant communication have demonstrated possibilities for fences has been noted in Gabon (Languy, 1996) , Ghana (M. Sam, pers. comm.), the Central African Republic manipulating elephants' behaviour using playback of vocalizations (Langbauer et al., 1991) . Future initiatives (B. Curran, pers. comm.) and Zimbabwe (MZEP, 2001) . While little conclusive data are available, it appears that could utilize certain calls that may be successful for repelling elephants. Whyte (1993) suggested that elephants in some situations simple, rudimentary, non-electrified fences can deter elephants. Fencing of any nature can may be emitting low frequency distress calls when they are being culled. If substantiated, these vocalizations prevent elephants from entering fields, at least in the short term. Low-tech fences made from locally available could be useful for repelling elephants. The problem with using elephant vocalizations as a repellent, howmaterial erected by individual farmers may be more successful at reducing conflict than electric fences, and ever, are that most are of low frequency and thus require expensive equipment to record and playback, and so far considerably less costly, because of the maintenance and theft issues associated with electric fencing. a noise that repels elephants has not been identified.
O 'Connell-Rodwell et al. (2000) found that tests conthan one-oC technical solutions or centralized PAC units because each conflict situation has its own local ducted around waterholes in Namibia had no deterrent eCects. However, advancements in technology and the characteristics. It is unlikely that the problem of crop loss will ever be eliminated entirely, but integrated reduction of the cost of these units may bring acoustic deterrents into wider application. management solutions such as those described in this paper may go some way towards mitigating the impact Tests with various chemical repellents have been undertaken in a number of field situations. In Malawi, of elephants on rural farmers. Bell (1984) conducted trials with HATE 4C, a commercially available deer repellent, on fields and found no
